The Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) stands as one of the most enduring symbols of Kashmiri nationalism, distinguished by its demand for complete independence of the former princely state of Jammu & Kashmir—rejecting accession to either India or Pakistan. The rise and eventual fragmentation of the JKLF are inseparable from its two towering leaders, Amanullah Khan and Yasin Malik, who shaped the trajectory of the movement as it exists today.
Formally founded in the United Kingdom by Amanullah Khan in 1977, the JKLF succeeded the National Liberation Front (NLF), an organization he had earlier co-founded with Maqbool Bhat in 1965, with largely the same objectives.
The NLF served as the underground armed wing of the Plebiscite Front, though the broader front never officially endorsed militant activity.
Though disorganized, the NLF’s early years carried an earnest and youthful revolutionary spirit. Bhat and Khan’s movement drew inspiration from the tactics of Palestinian organizations such as the PLO, believing similar high-profile actions could bring international attention to the Kashmiri struggle.
The most dramatic episode of this period was the Ganga hijacking on January 30, 1971, carried out by NLF members Hashim Qureshi and his cousin Ashraf Qureshi. Armed only with a toy pistol and fake explosives, they diverted the Indian Airlines Fokker F27 “Ganga” from Srinagar to Lahore, demanding the release of 36 imprisoned NLF members. Upon landing, within forty-five minutes, the hijackers released all passengers—an act which directly undermined any chance of negotiations with Indian authorities—and demanded political asylum in Pakistan.
Initially, the hijackers were received in Pakistan as heroes, meeting opposition leader Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and other key political figures. The situation quickly shifted after India “retaliated” by banning Pakistani civilian and military flights over its airspace.
At the time, West Pakistan was already straining to quell civil unrest in East Pakistan. The flight bans disrupted the movement of troops and resources, drastically raising fuel costs and extending travel times—factors that weakened Pakistan’s position the months leading up to the 1971 Bangladesh War and the eventual dismemberment of the country.
It was soon alleged that the Ganga had been retired from the Indian fleet five years earlier and only re-inducted shortly before the incident. These suspicious circumstances fueled doubts in Pakistan, with officials increasingly suspecting the episode to be a staged provocation or a false-flag operation. The reversal was swift: the Qureshis, Maqbool Bhat, and other NLF members were arrested in Pakistan, charged with conspiracy, and accused of being Indian agents.
Years later, a former officer of India’s intelligence agency Research & Analysis Wing (RAW), R.K. Yadav, wrote in his “tell-all” book that the hijacking was orchestrated by India. According to his account, Hashim Qureshi—initially an ISI recruit—was arrested by India’s Border Security Forces (BSF) and convinced to infiltrate the NLF on India’s behalf, carrying out the hijacking to implicate Pakistan.
The claim gains weight from the fact that, while all other NLF members arrested after the hijacking were released within two years, Qureshi remained imprisoned for nearly a decade. Following his release, he relocated to the Netherlands, only to later resurface in Kashmir.
Although he was briefly detained by Indian authorities upon his return—a fact he often cites to refute accusations of being an Indian agent—critics argue this detention, as well as the trial for the hijacking later on, was little more than a façade, designed to maintain the secrecy of the operation and obscure his collaboration.
Further, Qureshi’s actions throughout the rest of his life clearly lean towards a pro-India stance. He has also played a monumental role in propagating Pakistan as an enemy of Kashmiris.
In a 2008 interview, Qureshi stated:
“I had problems with the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front as I believed that the armed struggle in Indian Kashmir was not a freedom struggle and was being fought by Pakistan’s ISI. So, I resigned from the JKLF in 1993.”
The above statement is a major oversimplification of the complex relationship between the JKLF and the ISI, which will be covered in part two of this series.
In a 2016 interview, he claimed:
“Pakistan has never been supportive of the idea of an independent, secular Jammu and Kashmir. It would rather accept the division of Jammu and Kashmir into bits and pieces or even accept its accession to India, but never ever be supportive of the idea of an independent Kashmir. For them, I was a hardcore enemy. So, they kept me and Bhat in jails for nine years”.
While Pakistan has not been favorable toward the idea of an independent Jammu and Kashmir, it has consistently upheld the principle of the Kashmiri people’s right to self-determination.
This stance became a key point of friction with Amanullah Khan, who, in seeking ISI’s backing for the JKLF, refused to compromise on his commitment to absolute independence in favor of Pakistan’s line of self-determination.
Moreover, if Pakistan were truly prepared to accept Kashmir’s accession to India over independence, then why has it, despite decades of stalemate, consistently refused to accept the Line of Control (LoC) as the permanent border?
How does one explain the fact that the JKLF’s leadership in the Valley—including Yasin Malik—formed and maintained a tactical alliance with Syed Ali Shah Geelani, a pro-Pakistan figure, from as early as the mid-1980s through the 2010s? Geelani, who passed away in 2021 at the age of 91, continued advocating for Malik when the latter was arrested in 2019.
Qureshi’s claim that both him and Bhat were imprisoned for nine years after the Ganga hijacking is blatantly false, as it is a well-established fact that Bhat, after being released from prison in Pakistan, crossed over into the Kashmir Valley, and was subsequently arrested in 1976 by Indian authorities, where he soon received a death sentence.
With the NLF dismantled in Pakistan, Amanullah Khan and other leaders relocated to the UK, where the JKLF was formally established.
The JKLF’s first ideological crisis came in 1984 with the kidnapping of Indian diplomat Ravindra Mhatre in Birmingham, carried out by individuals tied to its alleged armed wing, the Kashmir Liberation Army (KLA). The kidnappers demanded Maqbool Bhat’s release from Tihar Jail and a monetary ransom.
When the kidnappers, who were allegedly under Amanullah Khan’s instructions, feared an imminent police crackdown—they killed Mhatre. His murder provoked immediate retaliation: within days, Maqbool Bhat—who had lingered in legal limbo despite an existing death sentence—was swiftly executed by the Indian government.
As Amanullah Khan was the leader of the JKLF, Indian authorities tied the diplomat’s murder directly to him, leading to his investigation by UK authorities and eventual expulsion, despite the lack of evidence.
To this day, details around the murder remain blurry. As late as 2005, individuals continued to be accused of carrying out the kidnapping and murder. Yet, the Indian government had been quick to manipulate the incident in 1984 to execute a popular figure of Kashmir’s liberation movement.
While some JKLF-affiliated individuals have “blamed” Amanullah Khan for Bhat’s death, these claims are extremely difficult to substantiate.
A central propagator of this theory in recent years has been Hashim Qureshi—whose record and alignments, as already noted, leave little doubt about his proximity to the Indian state.
Deeply opposed to militancy and linked with pro-accession politicians, Qureshi cannot, from any neutral standpoint, be treated as a reliable source. Khan maintained that rogue members of the JKLF, without his consent, set up the “KLA” and carried out the kidnapping. Given that the case remains unsolved, it is more than reasonable to give Khan the benefit of the doubt in this case.
It must be emphasized that in any armed struggle, a core element of the opposing state’s counterinsurgency strategy is to sow ideological rifts, generate ruptures, and cultivate suspicions that weaken a movement from within.
Against this backdrop, grave allegations—such as the claim that Amanullah Khan deliberately orchestrated Bhat’s death—must be treated with deep skepticism, subjected to rigorous critique, and situated within the broader logic of counterinsurgency campaigns designed to delegitimize and fracture resistance movements.
The late-1980s armed uprising in the Kashmir Valley marked a transformative moment for the JKLF, bringing forth leaders like Yasin Malik—figures who galvanized popular sentiment on an unprecedented scale and helped shape enduring contours of Kashmir’s liberation struggle.
Yet this new phase also introduced fresh complexities: the rise of new organizations, ideological divisions, and the inevitable tensions that accompany an armed struggle waged in what remains the most militarized region in the world.
